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ABSTRACT 
The axiomatic characterization of the value function of two-person 
zero-sum qames in normal form by VILKAS and TIJS is extended to dynamic 
games. Special attention is given to the value function of discounted two-
person zero-sum stochastic games. Furthermore, value functions for stochas-
tic games with arbitrary evaluation rules and general state and action 
spaces are examined. 
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1 . INTRODUC']~ION 
E.I. VILKAS characterized in [4] the value function for matrix games in 
an axiomatic way. TIJS extended in [3] this idea to the characterization of 
the value function for finite linear programs and to the characterization 
of the value function on the class of all determined two-person zero-sum 
games in normal form. 
In this paper we give an axiomatic description of the value function 
of discounted two-person zero-sum stochastic games. This will be done in 
Section 3, where the characterizing axioms can be indicated by the terms: 
objectivity, monotony and sufficiency for both players (or sufficiency for 
one of the players and symmetry). Herewith we will use the concept of a 
superfluous action for a player in a state of the game. Such an action can 
be ignored by a player without his being punished, because the value of the 
game remains invariant. We will also show in Section 3 that the characteriz-
ing axioms are mutually independent. 
In Section 4 we introduce the concept of a weak superfluous action. 
Ignoring such an action again does not change the value. With this concept 
we are able to characterize the value function without using the monotony 
axiom. Next in Section 4 a general description of the value functions of 
more general stochastic games with arbitrary monotone evaluation rules is 
given. 
In Section 2 we expose the model, which will be examined, we introduce 
the necessaiy concepts and give two lemmas, which contain some well-known 
facts about discounted two-person zero-sum stochastic games. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
For a finite set B = {1,2, ..• ,h} we denote by P(B) the set of prob-
ability measures on B. The elements of P(B) will be identified in an obvious 
way with elements of the set 
h 
xk ~ 0 for all k E B and l ~ = 1 } . 
k=l 
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A discounted two-person zero-sum stochastic game can be characterized 
by a six-tuple 
r -- <S,{Al (k): kE s},{A2(k): kE s},r,P,B>, 
where 
- S = {1,2, .... ,N}, 
- Al {k) = {1,2, ... ,II\_}, A2 (k) = {1,2, ... ,nk} fork ES, 
- r is a real--valued function defined on the set of triples 
T = {(k,i,j): k ES, i E A1 (k), j E A2 {k)}, 
- Pis a map from Tinto the set P(S), 
-SE(0,1). 
Swill be called the state space, A. (k) the set of pure actions of 
l 
player i (i = 1,2) in state k, r the reward function for player 1 (-r the 
reward function for player 2), P the transition probability map and B the 
discount factor. 
Such a stochastic game corresponds with a dynamic system, where the 
dynamic behavior as well as the rewards are influenced by the players at 
discrete points in time (called stages), say t = 0,1,2, ... , in the follow-
ing way. At each stage t the players observe the current state of the 
system. They, then, have to select, independently of one another, an action. 
If at stage t the system is in state k and if player 1 selects action 
i E A1 (k) and player 2 action j E A2 (k), then two things happen: 
(1) player 1 obtains an immediate reward r(k,i,j) from player 2; 
(2) the system moves with probability P(k,i,j){£} - which we denote by 
p(£1k,i,j) from now on - to state£ ES, which will be observed at 
the next stage t+l. 
A history dependent strategy 'IT. for player i in the game r (i = 1, 2) is 
l 
a rule, which, for each stage t E {0,1,2, ••. } and each state k ES, selects, 
dependent on t and the history of the game at stage t, an element of 
P(A. (k)) (according to which probability measure player i has to choose his 
l 
pure action in that situation, if he adopts that strategy). The history of 
the game at stage tis the sequence of states and actions, that actually 
have occurred up to time t. The set of history dependent strategies for 
player i is denoted by H .. 
1. 
A stationary strategy for player i is a rule, where for each stage t 
and each state k ES the selection of an element of P(A. (k)) is made in-
1. 
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dependent oft and the history of the game at time t. A stationary strategy 
can be denoted by 1ri = (1ril'1ri 2 , ... ,1riN), where 1rik E P(Ai(k)) for all 
k Es, i.e., each time the system is in state k, player i will play the 
mixed action 1rik" The set of stationary strategies for player i will be 
denoted by S:T .. 
1. 
If the players 1 and 2 play strategies 1r1 E H1 and 1r 2 E H2 , respectiv-
ely, then for each time t the expected reward at time t can be computed, 
and will be denoted by the N-vector 
where the k-·th coordinate corresponds with the specific game with state k 
as starting state. In stochastic games with discount factor S this stream 
of expected payoffs is evaluated by discounting the expected payoff at time 





where again the k-th component of v(1r 1 ,1r 2) corresponds to the specific game 
with state k as the starting state. Since 
with 
M = max lr(k,i,j) I, 
(k, i, j) ET 
it is obvious that v(1r 1 ,1r 2 ) is well-defined for each pair (1r 1 ,1r 2 ) EH1xH2 • 
Of course, we suppose that player 1 wants to maximize the coordinates of 
v(1r 1 ,1r 2 ) and player 2 wants to minimize this vector. 
4 
DEFINITION 2.1. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a value if 
inf sup v(n1 ,n2) = 
n2EH2 n1EHl 
sup inf v(n1 ,n2). 
n1EHl n2EH2 
DEFINITION 2.2. If a discounted stochastic game has a value, say V, then, 
for each E ~ 0, a strategy for player 1 is called E-optimal, if 
inf v(TI1,TI2) ~ V - El. 
TI 2EH2 
(Here! is the vector in lRN, for which all coordinates are equal to 1.) 
A strategy n2 E a2 is called E-optimal for player 2, if 
sup v(n 1,n2) s V + El. 
TilEHl 
0-optimal strategies are usually called optimal strategies. 
SHAPLEY was the first who analyzed discounted stochastic games and 
proved the following lemma [2]. 
LEMMA 2.3. Let r be a B-discounted stochastic game (with finite state space 
and finite pure action sets). Then r possesses a value, say V(f). Further-
more, both players possess optimal stationary strategies. For i = 1,2, a 
stationary strategy Tii = (Tii 1 , ••• ,TiiN) is optimal for player i, if and only 
if for each k ES, the action Tiik is an optimal action for player i in the 
matrix game 
<r{k,•,•) + B I p(tlk,•,•)V(f) (.Q.)>, 
tES 
i.e., the ~xnk-matrix game with in the (i,j)-th cell of the matrix the 
real number r(k,i,j) + B LtES p(tlk,i,j)V(f) (.Q.). This matrix game has value 
V(r) (k). 
The following lemma, well-known in Markov decision theory, will be 
useful in the sequel. A proof can be found in DENARDO & FOX [1], p.474. 
LEMMA 2.4. For (n1 ,n2) E ST1xsT2 the total B-discounted expected payoff 
v(n1 ,n2) is the unique solution of the following set of N functional equa-
N 
tions in x E lR : 
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for all k € S, 
where r(k,n 1k,n 2k) and p(tjk,Tilk'n2k) are the expectations of the functions 
r(k,•,•) and p(tjk,•,•) on A1 (k)xA2 (k) with respect to the probability 
measure n1kxn 2k. If y € m.N is such that for all k € S 
then 
DEFINITION 2.5. For a S-discounted stochastic gamer an action i € A1 (k) 
(k € S), is called superfluous, if there exists an action i 1k € P(A1 (k)) 
such that i 1k(i) = 0 and such that for each j € A2 (k): 
(2. 1) 
r(k,i,j) + S L p(tjk,i,j)V(f) (£) ~ 
£€S 
r(k,1r 1k 1 j) + S l p(tjk,i1k,j)V(f) (£). 
£ES 
If (2.1) holds and i 1k(i) = 0, then we say that i is superfluous in view 
of action n1k. An action j E A2 (k) (k ES) is called superfluous if there 
exists an action i 2k E P(A2 (k)) such that i 2k(j) = 0 and such that for each 
i E Al (k) : 
r(k,i,j) + S L p(tjk,i,j)V(f) (£) ~ 
£ES 
r(k,i,i2k) + S l p(tjk,i,1r2k)V(f) (£). 
£ES 
In the next section it is shown, that ignoring superfluous actions, 
does not disturb the value of the game. 
In the following we denote by G(N,S) the family of S-discounted 
stochastic games with N states and finite sets of actions for both players. 
We want to characterize the function V: G(N,S) + m.N, where for each 
r E G(N,S), V(f) is the value of the gamer. 
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3. CHARACTERIZING PROPERTIES OF THE VALUE FUNCTION FOR DISCOUNTED 
STOCHASTIC GAMES 
In this section we first prove four properties of the value function 
on G(N,S). Next we show that a function on G(N,S), satisfying these four 
properties, necessarily must be the value function. Furthermore, we show 
that the four properties are mutually independent. 
PROPERTY 1 (Objectivity). Let r E G(N,S) be such that for state k ES we 
I -1 have~=~= 1 and p(k k,1,1) = 1. Then V(f) (k) = (1-S) r(k,1,1). 
PROOF. If we start in state k, then we stay in state k for all pairs of 
,00 t 
strategies (TI 1 ,TI 2) and the total S-discounted payoff equals lt=O S r(k,1,1) = 
-1 
(1-S) r(k,1,1). 0 
PROPERTY 2 (Monotony). Let r•,r 11 E G(N,S) and suppose that all game param-
eters, except the reward functions r' and r", are the same. Let r' (k,i,j) ~ 
r"(k,i,j) for all (k,i,j) E r. Then V(I'') ~ V(f"). 
PROOF. Trivial. 0 
PROPERTY 3.1 (Sufficiency for player 1). For r E G(N,S), let an action 
i E A1 (k) be superfluous. Let r• E G(N,S) be the game, which results from 
r, when we delete action i. Then V(f) = V(I''). 
PROOF. First we note that obviously V(f') ~ V(f) (the set of strategies for 
player 1 is reduced, the set of strategies for player 2 and the other game 
parameters remain unchanged; now the inequality can directly be seen from 
the definition of a value). Hence we have to prove that also V(I'') ~ V(f). 
Suppose that we can construct a stationary strategy rr 1 for player 1 
in the gamer•, satisfying 
(3. 1) r(s,rr 1s,TI2s) + S l p(tls,rr1s,TI 2s)V(f) (£) ~ V(f) (s) 
£ES 
for alls Es and all stationary strategies TI 2 in the gamer•. 
(Note that ST2 is the same set in both games rand f'.) 
Then, in view of Lemma 2.4 with V(I') in the role of y, we may conclude that 
V(f) ~ V(n 1 ,TI2) for all TI 2 E ST2 • But as Lemma 2.3 shows that player 2 has 
an optimal stationary strategy, we have 
V(f) ~ inf V(n1,TI2) ~ V(f'). 
TI 2EST 
Hence, the only thing required to finish the proof is to construct 
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n1 = (n 11 , ••• ,i 1N) with property (3.1). For each s ES - {k} take n 1s such 
that n 1s is optimal in the matrix game <r(s,•,•) + f3 I.!lES p(.!lls,•,•)V(r) (.fl)>. 
Since this matrix game has value V(s) (Lemma 2.3), property (3.1) is satis-
fied for s # k. Now let i E A1 (k) be superfluous in view of action 
Tilk E P(A1 (k)), i.e., (2.1) holds 
- * and Tilk(i) = 0. Take ~lk E P(A1 (k)) such 
* that Tilk is optimal in the matrix game <r(k,•,•) + f3 I.!lES p(.!l!k,•,•)V(r) (.!I,)>. 
Now define i 1k as follows: 
for all i' in the set of actions A1 (k) - {i} of player 1 in 
state k of the gamer•. 
Then, obviously, i 1k E P(A1 (k) - {i}). Furthermore, it follows with the aid 
of (2.1) that (3.1) is also satisfied for s = k. This completes the proof 
of property 3.1. D 
Quite analogously, we can show the validity of: 
PROPERTY 3.2 (Sufficiency for player 2). For r E G(N,S), let an action 
j E A2 (k) be superfluous. Let r• E G(N,S) be the game, which results from 
r, when we delete action j. Then V(f') = V(f). 
Now we state our main result. 
THEOREM 3 .1. A function f: G (N, S) ➔ lRN equals the value function if and 
only if f obeys the following axioms: 
Axiom 1 (objectivity). If r E G(N,S) is such that for state k ES we have 
I -1 ~ = nk = 1 and p(k k,1,1) = 1, then f(r) (k) = (1-f3) r(k,1,1). 
Axiom 2 (monotony). If two games r• and r" in G(N,S) of equal size are such 
that the transition probability maps are the same and for the reward 
8 
functions r' and r" we haver' ::,; r", then f(f') ::,; f(f"). 
Axiom 3.i (Sufficiency for player i, i = 1,2). If f' E G(N,B) results from 
r E G(N,B) by deleting a superfluous action of player i, then f(f') = f(f). 
PROOF. The "only if" part of the theorem follows from the already proven 
properties 1, 2, 3.1 and 3.2 for the value function. 
Now let f be a function, obeying the axioms 1, 2, 3.1 and 3.2. 
The proof of the "if" part of the theorem will proceed in two steps. In the 
first step we only consider stochastic games r E G(N,B), which have a state 
k and a pair of actions (iO,j 0) E A1 (k)xA2 (k) such that 
· p(klk,i,j) = 1 if i = io or j = jo 
and such that 
(3. 2) inf r(k,i0 ,j) 
jEA2 (k) 
For such games we show that 
( 3. 3) f(f) (k) = V(f) (k). 
sup r(k,i,j 0). 
iEAl (k) 
In the second step we consider arbitrary elements of G(N,B) and connect 
them with games of the form treated in the first step. 
(1) Let r be a game in G(N,B) with state k and actions i 0 and jO as 
indicated above. Obviously V(f) (k) = (1-B)- 1r(k,i0 ,j 0). 
Let M be a large real number. Look at the games f' and f" in G(N,B) which 
differ from r only in the reward functions r' and r" as follows: 
r' (R.,i,j) = r(R.,i,j) if R. = k 
r' ( R,, i, j) = r ( R,, i, j) -M elsewhere. 
and i = i 
0 
or j = j 
0 
r" (R.,i,j) = r(R.,i,j) if R. = k and i = i O or j = j 0 , 
r"(R.,i,j) = r(R.,i,j)+M elsewhere. 
From the monotony properties off follows 
(3.4) f(f') ::,; f(f) ::,; f(f"). 
We concentrate our attention on the game f'. For M large enough it is ob-
vious that for each i E A1 (k) - {iO} we have 
r' (k,i,j) + f3 L p' (Jllk,i,j)V(f') (Jl) :,; 
JlES 
(Note that V(f) (k) = V(f') (k).) This shows that for the gamer• each action 
i in state k, unequal to i 0 , is superfluous in view of action i 0 • So we 
may successively delete all actions i ~ i 0 , without disturbing the f-value 
by axiom 3.1. Then there only remains action i 0 in state k. In view of 
(3.2) we can in this new game also delete each action j E A2 (Jl) - {j0 }, 
using axiom 3.2. This results in a game f with f(f') = f(f), and where 
state k is such that 1\: = nk = 1 and p(klk,1,1) = 1. In view of axiom 1 we 
obtain 
f c r • > Ck) = f c n Ck) -1 = (1-13) r(k,1,1) = 
9 
Analogously it can be shown that also f(f") (k) = (1-f3)- 1r(k,i0 ,j 0) = V(f) (k). 
Combining these results with (3. 4) leads to (3.3). 
(2)Now we start with the second step of the proof. Let r E G(N,13) be an 
arbitrary game with value V(f) and let k E S be an arbitrary state. Now 
consider the game rk, which is constructed from r, by adding in state k an 
action i 0 for player 1 and an action j 0 for player 2 and by extending the 
reward function rand the transition probability map P of r such that 
r(k,i,j) = (l-f3)V(f) (k) if i = i or j = jo, and 0 
p(klk,i,j) = 1 if i = io or j = jo· 
Clearly, V (fk) =V(f). Furthermore, rk . with state k of the type is a game 
treated in the first step of the proof. Hence, 
(3. 5) 
Our proof is complete, if we can show that the actions i 0 and jO are super-
fluous, because then axioms 3.1 and 3.2 give 
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Take an optimal stationary strategy Til for player 1 in the gamer. By Lemma 
2.3 we have 
(3 .6) r(k,Tilk'j) + S l p(Jljk,Tilk'j)V(r) (Jl) ~ V(r) {k) 
JlES 
for each j E A2 (k). 
The same holds for the game rk_ For the action j 0 we have 
(3. 7) l p ( Jl I k, TI lk, j) V ( r) (JI,) = 
JlES 
(1-S)V(r) (k) + S V(r) (k) = V(r) (k). 
However, for the right-hand sides in (3.6) and (3.7) the following holds: 
(3. 8) 
= r(k,i0 ,j) + S I p(Jllk,i0 ,j)V(r) (Jl) 
JlES 
Since V(fk) = V(f), it follows from (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) that in the game 
rk the action i 0 is superfluous for player 1 in view of Tilk" In an analog-
ous way, one can show that jO is superfluous. This completes the proof of 
the theorem. D 
Now we want to show that the four axioms 1, 2, 3.1 and 3.2 are inde-
pendent. We do this by giving for each triple of them a function from 
G(N,S) into ]RN satisfying these three axioms and not the fourth axiom. 
(a) (Objectivity). Let f 1 : G(N,S) ➔ ]RN be the map with f 1 (r) = 0 for all 
r E G(N,S). Obviously, f 1 satisfies the axioms 2, 3.1 and 3.2, but not 
axiom 1. 
(b) (Sufficiency for player 1). Let f 2 : G(N,S) ➔ ]RN be the map defined by 
= min{r(k,i,j) + S L p(Jljk,i,j)V(r) (Jl)} 
i, j JlES 
for each r E G(N,S) and k Es. 
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Then f 2 obeys the axioms 1, 2 and 3.2, but not axiom 3.1. 
N 
(c) (Sufficiency for player 2). Let f 3 : G(N,8) ➔ JR be the map with 
f 3 (r) (k) = max{r(k,i,j) + 8 l.. p(Q,ik,i,j)V(r) (Q,)}. 
i,j Q,ES 
Then f 3 satisfies the axioms 1, 2 and 3.1, but not axiom 3.2. 
(d) (Monotony). More work has to be done to show that axiom 2 is independent 
of the other axioms. First we look at matrix games. For a matrix game A, let 
I(A) be the set of pure strategies (rows) i for player 1, which are not 
superfluous and which are such that n 1 (i) = 0 for each optimal action n 1 
of player 1. Let J(A) have the analoguous meaning for player 2. Suppose 
now that a superfluous row of A is deleted, resulting in a matrix game A'. 
Then it is obvious that I(A') I(A) and J(A') c J(A). It may happen that 
J (A' ) -:/= J (A)1 as the following Example 3. 2 shows. Now for a matrix game A 
let I 0 (A) bE~ the subset of I (A) , consisting of those i for which i E I (A') 
for each matrix A', which can be obtained from A by deleting superfluous 
rows and superfluous columns in any possible order. Let J 0 (A) have the 
analoguous meaning for player 2. In Example 3.2 the sets I 0 (A) and J 0 (A) 
are empty. '.rhat is not the case in Example 3. 3. 
EXAMPLE 3.2. Let A be the matrix Then I(A) = {2} and J(A) = 
If the superfluous row 1 of A is deleted, we obtain the matrix A' = [~ 
for which I(A') = {1'} = {2} = I(A) and J(A') = {1'} = {1} c J(A). 
Furthermore, I 0 (A) = ¢. J 0 (A) = ¢. 
EXAMPLE 3.3. Let B be the matrix [i ; l]· Then r0 (B) = J 0 (B) = (1,2). 
Now we return to stochastic games. For r E G(N,8) and k ES let Bk be 
the matrix game <r(k,•,•) +8 [£ES p(£jk,•,•)V(r) (Q,)>. Let f 4 : G(N,8) ➔ JRN 
be defined as follows: 
=V(f)(k) - I I bk(i,j). 
iEI0 (Bk) jEJO(Bk) 
Then obviously f 4 satisfies the axioms 1, 3.1 and 3.2. We show that f 4 does 
not satisfy axiom 2. 
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Suppose that I' is such that B1 is equal to the matrix Bin Example 3.3. 
(Such a game exists~) Then V ( r) ( 1) = 3. Hence f 4 ( r) (1) = 3-6-0-0-6 = -9. 
Let I'' be the stochastic game, which differs from r only in the fact that 
r' (k, 1, 1) = r (k, 1, 1) + 1. Then r :$ r' , and V ( r) = V (I'') , but f 4 (I'') (1) = 
= 3-7-0-0-6 = -10 < f 4 (r) (1). Hence f 4 does not satisfy the monotony axiom. 
Finally, we want to look at another interesting property of the value 
function, called symmetry. Therefore, we introduce the transpose of a 
stochastic game, which is the stochastic game that we obtain by interchang-
ing the names of the players. 
DEFINITION 3.4. Let I' = <S,{A1 (k): k E s}, {A2 (k): k E s} ,r,P,B> be a 
T 
stochastic game. Then the transpose r of r is the stochastic game 
where 
and 
T T <S,{A2(k): k E s},{A1 (k): k E s},r ,P ,B>, 
pT(Jl,jk,a2 ,a1) = p(Jl,jk,a1 ,a2) for all k,JI, E: Sand 
a 1 E Al (k), a 2 E: A2 (k). 
Now we say that a function f: G(N,B) ➔ JRN is symmetric, if the fol-
lowing axiom holds: 
Axiom 4 (symme!try). f(-I'T) = -f(r) for all r E: G(N,B). 
It is straightforward to prove that the value function V has the fol-
lowing 
PROPERTY 4 (Symmetry). V(-I'T) = -V(I') for all r E: G(N,B). 
Furthermore, it is simple to show that axiom 3.2 follows from axiom 
3.1 and axiom 4. This implies that we have the following alternative 
characterization of the value function. 
THEOREM 3. 5. )l function f: G (N, B). ➔ ]RN equals the value function iff f 
obeys axioms Jl, 2, 3.1 and 4. 
4. REMARKS AND GENERALIZATIONS 
We start with giving another characterization of the value function, 
in which the monotony property no longer plays a role. For that purpose 
we need the following 
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DEFINITION 4.1. For a $-discounted stochastic gamer an action i in state k 
for player 1 is called weakly superfluous, if for each Tilk E P(A1 (k)) there 
exists an action n1k E P(A1 (k)) with n1k(i) = 0 and such that 
inf r(k,fflk'j) + s I p(tlk,fflk'j)V(f) (Q,) ~ 
jEA2 (k) tES 
inf r(k,Tilk'j) + s I p(tjk,Tilk'j)V(r) (Q,). 
jEA2 (k) tES 
It is obvious that a superfluous action is also a weakly superfluous 
action (but the converse does not necessarily hold). This implies that the 
following property is stronger than property 3.1. 
PROPERTY 3.lw (Weak sufficiency for player 1). For a gamer let action 
i E A1 (k) (k ES) be weakly superfluous. Let r• be the game, which results 
when action i is deleted. Then V(f) = V(f'). 
It will be ovious how to formulate 
PROPERTY 3.2w (Weak sufficiency for player 2). 
Now we are ready to give the other characterization. 
THEOREM 4.2. A function f: G(N,S) ➔ lRN equals the value function if and 
only if f satisfies the objectivity property and the properties 3.lw and 
3.2w. 
PROOF. In the proof of Theorem 3.1, the only place where the monotony axiom 
is used, is in the first step, where the gamer is compared with two games 
r• and f". From those last two games superfluous actions could be deleted. 
But now we no longer need games r• and f", because directly in gamer with 
a state k with a saddle-point as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, at once all 
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actions of player 1 unequal to i 0 can be deleted successively, as they are 
all weakly superfluous in view of action i 0. The remainder of the proof 
proceeds analogously as the proof of Theorem 3.1. D 
Now we also want to look at value functions for more general classes of 
dynamic games, where the evaluation of the payoff stream is not necessarily 
the S-discount criterion but, e.g., the t-step criterion, the total expected 
payoff criterion, or the average expected payoff criterion, and where the 
state and action spaces are not necessarily finite. 
We look at dynamic games of the form 
f <S,{Al (s): s E S},{A2 (s): s E S},r,P>, 
where the parameters have an analogous meaning as in Section 2, but now the 
state space and action spaces are non-empty measurable spaces, with 
measurable one-point sets, and the reward function and the transition prob-
ability map are measurable functions. Let us denote for a fixed state space 
S, the family of those games by GS. It will be obvious what history depen-
dent strategies are in such a gamer. Now suppose that there is given some 
evaluation rule w: H1xH2 ➔ lRs, which assigns to each pair (rr 1 ,rr 2 ) E H1xH 2 
s 
an element w(rr 1 ,rr 2 ) E lR, where w(rr 1 ,rr 2 ) (s) can be interpreted as the 
payoff of the specific game with states as starting state, when the players 
choose the strategies rr 1 and rr 2 . For these general stochastic games with 
prescribed evaluation rule w the notions of value and c::-optimal strategies 
can be defined similarly as in Section 2. 
For two games r• and f" of equal size, which differ only in the 
reward functions r' and r", we write r' :5: f" + d (d E JR) if 
r' (s,a1 ,a2) :5: r" (s,a1 ,a2) + d for all s E S and (a1 ,a2) E A1 (s) xA2 (s). 
In the following we only look at evaluation rules w which satisfy the fol-
lowing monotony condition: 
Assumption M. There exists a c E (0, 00 ] such that r• :5: f" + d implies that 
w' (rr 1 ,rr 2 ) (s) :5: w"(rr 1 ,rr 2 ) (s) + de for all (TT1,TT2) E H1XH2 
ands Es. 
Assumption M assures that r• = f" + d implies that 
w' (,r 1,n 2) (s) = w" (,r 1 ,n 2) (s) + cd for all (,r 1 ,n 2) E H1 xH2 
ands ES. 
Furthermore, for a gamer with a states and a pair of actions 
(i,j) E Al (s)xA2 (s), such that 
and such that 
sup r(s,a1 ,j) = 
a 1EAl (s) 
inf r(s,i,a2) 
a 2EA2 (s) 
= r(s,i,j), 
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assumption M guarantees that for the specific game with states as starting 
state, the strategies "always playing action i", notation n!s, respectively 
"always playing action j", notation 1T~s, are optimal for player 1, respec-
tively player 2. Then the value of the specific game with states as start-
is js 
ing state equals w(n 1 ,n2 ) (s). 
Now, for a monotone evaluation rule w, let G8 (w) be the family of 
games r E G8 , which possesses a finite value with respect to the evaluation 
rule w. For ans ES and an i E A1 (s) let us denote by rr 1 (s,i) the family 
of history-dependent strategies 1T 1 E rr 1 , which do not use action i, i.e. if the 
system is at stage tin states, then for each history of the game at 
state t, such a strategy n1 selects a probability measure on A1 (s) with 
mass zero in i. 
DEFINITION 4.3. For a gamer E G8 (w) an action i E A1 (s) is non-essential 
for player 1, if for each i 1 E H1 and each£> O, there exists a strategy 
n1 (£,i 1) E rr 1 (s,i), such that 
An action j E A2 (s) is non-essential for player 2 if for each i 2 E H2 and 
each£> 0, there exists a strategy n2 (£,i2) E rr2 (s,j), such that 
for all 1T l E Hl and all s E S. 
It can be seen that a game which results from a game in G8 (w) after 
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deleting a non-essential action for a player, is again a member of GS(w) and 
that the value does not change. So, in some sense, the set A1 (s) - {i} is 
sufficient for player 1 if action i is non-essential. 
In the next theorem we characterize the value function on the family 
GS(w). A proof can be obtained by slightly modifying the proof of Theorem 
3.1 and will be omitted. 
s 
THEOREM 4.4. ll. function f: GS(w) ➔ lR equals the value function if and 
only if f obeys the following four axioms: 
(1) axiom of objectivity: if r E GS (w) is such that for a state s both 
players have only one action, say i and j respectively, and if p(sls,i,j) = 1, 
__ is js 
then f ( f) ( s) -- w ( TT 1 , Tr 2 ) ( s) • 
(2) axiom of monotony: if I'' ~ I'", then fer') :,; f (f"). 
(3.i) axiom of sufficiency for player i; i = 1,2: if I'' is derived from r 
by deleting a certain state a non-essential action of player i, then 
f ( r' ) ( s) = f ( r) ( s) for all s E s. 
Similarly, as in Section 3, axiom 3.b can be replaced by a symmetry 
axiom and also in this case one can show that the axioms in Theorem 4.4 
are independent. 
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